Outline
- Abstract
- Keywords
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Strategies Involved in Uncertainty Handling in Decision-Making
- 3. Methodology
- 4. Results
- 4.1. Case 1. Aalborg Municipality: Waste Handling Plan 2007
- 4.2. Case 2. Aalborg Municipality: Water Supply Plan 2009
- 4.3. Case 3. Hjørring Municipality: Municipal Spatial Plan 2009
- 4.4. Case 4. Struer Municipality: Municipal Spatial Plan 2009
- 4.5. Case 5. Vesthimmerland Municipality: Municipal Spatial Plan 2009
- 4.6. Implications of Found Avoidance Practice
- 5. Discussion and Conclusion
- 5.1. Reasons for Non-Handling of Climate Change Uncertainty
- References
رئوس مطالب
- چکیده
- کلید واژه ها
- 1.مقدمه
- 2. استراتژی های موجود در مواجهه با عدم قطعیت در تصمیم گیری
- 3. متدولوژی
- 4. نتایج
- 1.4. مورد 1: شهرداری آلبورگ؛ طرح مدیریت فاضلاب در سال 2007
- 2.4. مورد 2: شهرداری آلبورگ؛ طرح تامین آب در سال 2009
- 3.4. شهرداری هیورینگ: طرح آمایش شهری در سال 2009
- 4.4. مورد 4: شهرداری استوئر؛ طرح آمایش شهری در سال 2009
- 5.4. مورد 5: شهرداری وستمورلند؛ طرح آمایش شهری در سال 2009
- 6.4. دستاوردهای اجتناب از عدم قطعیت
- 5. بحث و نتیجه گیری
- 1.5. دلایل عدم مواجهه با عدم قطعیت تغییر اقلیم
Abstract
This article is concerned with how Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) practice handles climate change uncertainties within the Danish planning system. First, a hypothetical model is set up for how uncertainty is handled and not handled in decision-making. The model incorporates the strategies ‘reduction’ and ‘resilience’, ‘denying’, ‘ignoring’ and ‘postponing’. Second, 151 Danish SEAs are analysed with a focus on the extent to which climate change uncertainties are acknowledged and presented, and the empirical findings are discussed in relation to the model. The findings indicate that despite incentives to do so, climate change uncertainties were systematically avoided or downplayed in all but 5 of the 151 SEAs that were reviewed. Finally, two possible explanatory mechanisms are proposed to explain this: conflict avoidance and a need to quantify uncertainty.
Keywords: Climate change - Decision-making - Strategic Environmental Assessment - UncertaintyConclusions
Among the concerns dealt with in SEA, the potential effect of climate change is a relatively new one that is given increasing attention. The European Commission’s evaluation from 2009 shows that in SEA “specific attention to climate change issues appears still to be limited in many Member States” but that there seems to be increasing attention paid to the issue (COWI, 2009, p. 116). It is further underlined by the EU Commission in April 2013 with its ‘Guidance on Integrating Climate Change and Biodiversity into Strategic Environmental Assessment’ (European Commission, 2013). Wilson (2010) has examined UK sustainability appraisals and found that they do address climate change, but that development of the approach is still needed. Weiland (2010) states the German experiences that questions of climate change in SEA are not often raised. This points to climate change in SEA as an emerging issue for research and practice, but it also shows that there are challenges associated with it; among these is uncertainty.
Based on the document study reported in this article, we assert that in spite of the relevance of identifying and presenting climate change uncertainty in SEA or plans, SEA practice does not seem to recognise, take into account, and communicate problems arising from climate change uncertainty. The analysis reveals that only 5 out of 151 environmental reports have an explicit communication pertaining to climate change uncertainties, although 87 of the reports deal with climate change. Through this study it has not been possible to determine whether uncertainty is handled implicitly within the SEA process, but not communicated in writing. If this is the case, and the handling of uncertainty is more extensive in practice, it is still considered problematic to have a SEA practice with implicit handling and no transparency regarding uncertainty. This presents an opportunity to expand the empirical studies to encompass the implicit strategies for handling uncertainty, which are not apparent from a document study. When uncertainty is included in the reports, it is in the form of acknowledged ignorance related to the possible consequences of climate change. By not communicating uncertainties in the reports, there is a risk that both politicians and the public will interpret the impact assessments as more certain than they actually are. 5.1. Reasons for non-handling of climate change uncertainty These findings warrant a more general discussion of reasons for choosing non-handling strategies. One is a need or desire to avoid conflict, especially in already contested situations where explicit acknowledgement of uncertainty may spark further conflict and lack of trust in authority. Planners and decision-makers need to attain accountability and support for their decisions. When seen in this light, uncertainty is threatening to planners and decision-makers, and it makes them vulnerable to criticism and attack (Jaeger et al., 2001, p. 214). To avoid opening up conflicts and opposition to their decisions, planners and decision-makers could thus ignore uncertainty Dessai and van der Sluijs (2007, p. 11) point out the inexpedience of this argument of ignoring uncertainty when they state that not addressing uncertainties leaves “…policies highly vulnerable to deconstruction in societal discourses and controversies on these policies”. Further, they stress that such vulnerability can be used in conflicts by those opposing a decision (Dessai and van der Sluijs, 2007). Part of this reasoning might be that planners and decision-makers choose to ignore uncertainty in order to more or less deliberately create a (false) sense of security and instil trust (Lipshitz and Strauss, 1997).
Another reason for uncertainty avoidance can be the perceived need for quantification of the assessment or of uncertainty. This can be part of the choice of not addressing uncertainty and uncertain issues, when quantification is not possible. Our propensity to quantify is described by Ben-Haim (2006, p. 9) and succinctly captured in the statement that “We are an age of number-givers, and the first advice to a novice in the modern world would be: if it stands still, measure it; if it moves, clock its speed”. Dessai and van der Sluijs (2007, p. 11) propose that “[the] focus on statistical and quantitative methods of uncertainty assessment leads to a tendency to ignore policy relevant uncertainty information about the deeper dimensions of uncertainty that in principle cannot be quantified”. As such, planners and decision-makers may avoid uncertainty because it does not always meet the demand for quantification. In a survey of perceptions of climate change among actors in the Baltic Sea Region one conclusion is that “it is a popular fallacy that policy making should mainly be based on quantitative findings from science, a fallacy that hinders adequate action” (Eisenack et al., 2007, p. 9). Thus at times, the lack of ability to quantify stands in the way of dealing appropriately with issues. From a research perspective, the results of this study suggest that significant gaps remain in knowledge as to why uncertainty is inadequately addressed and communicated in Strategic Environmental Assessments. While it is difficult to generalise across the range of different political, institutional, and cultural contexts on the basis of the Danish experience, previous empirical work in other European contexts (see, for example, work from the UK (Posas, 2011), and The Netherlands (Wardekker et al., 2008) have come to similar conclusions.
From the perspective of practice, this study exposes a significant gap between SEA guidance and actual practice regarding the acknowledgement and handling of uncertainty of climatic considerations in Danish spatial and sector plans. As the European Union prepares to amend existing legislation for EIA and has issued new guidance for EIA and SEA to include climate change mitigation and adaptation considerations, as well as uncertainty, how to handle and communicate uncertainty should be prioritized with a particularly keen eye on the different needs of the scientific, policy, and non-scientific communities