Outline

  • Abstract
  • Keywords
  • Jel Classification
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Background, Related Literature, and Empirical Prediction
  • 2.1. Financial Statement Comparability
  • 2.2. Ex Ante Crash Risk
  • 2.3. Link Between Financial Statement Comparability and Ex Ante Crash Risk
  • 3. Research Design
  • 3.1. Measurement of Perceived Crash Risk
  • 3.2. Comparability Measurement
  • 3.3. Empirical Model
  • 4. Sample and Descriptive Statistics
  • 5. Empirical Results
  • 5.1. Main Results
  • 5.2. Alternative Measures of Comparability
  • 5.3. Other Robustness Tests
  • 6. Additional Tests
  • 6.1. Further Exploration of the Effect of Comparability on Expected Crash Risk
  • 6.1.1. High- Versus Low-Quality Information Environment
  • 6.1.2. Strong Versus Weak External Monitoring
  • 6.1.3. High Versus Low Product Market Competition
  • 6.2. Effect of Comparability on Voluntary Corporate Disclosure
  • 7. Conclusions
  • Appendix A. Variable Definitions
  • Appendix B. Measurement of Implied Volatility Smirk
  • Appendix C. Alternative Measures of Comparability
  • C.1. Earnings Comovement
  • C.2. Comparability Measures of Barth Et Al. (2012)
  • References

رئوس مطالب

  • چکیده
  • کلید واژه ها
  • 1. مقدمه
  • 2. پیشینه، منابع مرتبط و پیش بینی تجربی
  • 1.2. قابلیت مقایسه صورت مالی
  • 2.2. ریسک سقوط آتی
  • 2.3. ارتباط بین قابلیت مقایسه صورت مالی و ریسک سقوط آتی
  • 3. طراحی پژوهش
  • 3.1. اندازه گیری ریسک سقوط ادراک شده
  • 3.2. اندازه گیری قابلیت مقایسه
  • 3.3. مدل تجربی
  • 4. نمونه و آمار توصیفی
  • 5. نتایج تجربی
  • 5.1. نتایج اصلی
  • 5.2. معیارهای جایگزین قابلیت مقایسه
  • 5.3. سایر آزمون های استواری
  • 6. آزمون های دیگر
  • 6.1. بررسی بیشتر تاثیر قابلیت مقایسه بر ریسک سقوط مورد انتظار
  • 6.2. تاثیر قابلیت مقایسه بر افشای داوطلبانه شرکت
  • 7. نتیجه گیری
  • ضمیمه a. تعریف متغیر
  • ضمیمه b. اندازه گیری چولگی نوسان ضمنی
  • ضمیمه c. معیارهای جایگزین قابلیت مقایسه
  • c.1. جابجایی همزمان سود
  • 2.c. معیارهای قابلیت مقایسه بارت و همکاران (2012)

Abstract

This study examines the impact of financial statement comparability on ex ante crash risk. Using the comparability measures of De Franco et al. (2011), we find that expected crash risk decreases with financial statement comparability, and this negative relation is more pronounced in an environment where managers are more prone to withhold bad news. We also provide evidence that comparability can mitigate the asymmetric market reaction to bad versus good news disclosures. Our results suggest that financial statement comparability disinclines managers from bad news hoarding, which reduces investors׳ perceptions of a firm׳s future crash risk.

Keywords: - -

Conclusions

In this study, we examine whether comparability reduces investors’ perception of crash risk. We find that the steepness of the volatility smirk decreases with financial statement comparability and this negative relation is more pronounced for firms with a lower-quality information environment, for firms with weak external monitoring, and for firms operating in a less competitive industry. Moreover, we find that managers’ general tendency to withhold bad news relative to good news is mitigated for firms with higher financial statement comparability. These results support our argument that financial statement comparability discourages managers from hiding bad news and accumulating it within a firm, which reduces investors’ perceptions of a firm’s future crash risk.

Our study adds to the prior literature that examines the benefits of financial statement comparability. Our results suggest that accounting comparability reduces ex ante crash risk by helping outside investors make cross-firm comparisons of disclosure policies and firm performance. Moreover, our study extends the literature on the role of financial reporting quality in the capital market by focusing on its relation to ex ante crash risk. Thus, our results are relevant to standard setters and regulators who underscore the importance of understanding ex ante crash risk. Finally, our study adds to prior literature that focuses on the managerial asymmetric disclosure of good versus bad news (e.g. Skinner, 1997; Kothari et al., 2009; Ali et al., 2015). We show that financial statement comparability disinclines corporate managers from withholding bad news.

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