رئوس مطالب
- چکیده
- کلیدواژه ها
- مقدمه
- قراردادها و فرانشیزهای زیرساخت ها
- مناقصه و تنظیم مقررات
- رویکرد جدیدی برای تلفیق کیفیت در قراردادهای مدیریت زیرساخت
- نزدیک شدن به مساله
- تعریف کیفیت
- تجزیه و تحلیل طرح پیشنهادی
- مکانیسم مناقصه
- محدودیت های مدل
- تعریف شاخص کیفیت: مورد بزرگراه های شیلی
- نتایج
Abstract
In recent years, several public authorities have been making advances in developing bidding terms for contracts regulating the management of infrastructure. Up to now these bidding terms have focused on granting the contract to the bidder who, having agreed to comply with the requirement of a specified level of quality, as stipulated in the contract, submits the lowest tender in terms of price. As a result, the experience of implementing quality-related incentives for the management of infrastructure has been scarce. This paper demonstrates that, if infrastructure quality is verifiable and the social benefit derived from it is measurable, there is a better way both to tender and to regulate those contracts, based on a combination of price and quality standards. In addition, the paper proposes a new procurement procedure to encourage bidders to provide better quality levels. The last part of the paper provides a practical example of how to calculate a quality index for contracts regulating the management of infrastructure. The paper ends with a set of conclusions related to the advantages of the new tendering mechanism and its possible application.
Keywords: Bids - Construction industry - Contract administration - Infrastructure - RegulationsConclusions
From the analysis carried out in this paper the following conclusions can be drawn:
1. The “infrastructure maintenance and operation contracts by minimum standards” normally employed around the world to regulate infrastructure quality do not create an optimal structure for encouraging contractors to perform to the best of their ability, with the result that they do not achieve an optimal “net social benefit.”
2. If infrastructure quality were verifiable (measurable at a low cost) and if the gross social benefit derived from a specific quality level were measurable, it would be possible to carry out a new procurement and regulation process based on both price and quality. This new procurement mechanism, which creates an optimal incentive structure, would grant the contract or franchise to the company that tenders an optimal price/quality ratio, according to its productive capacity.
3. The above mechanism allows an important increase in “net social benefit” to take place compared with the “infrastructure maintenance and operation contracts by minimum standards.” Moreover, the greater the competitiveness of the company, the higher the optimal quality level and the “net social benefit” derived from it.
4. The procurement process defined should encourage bidders to submit tenders that are as realistic as possible. To this end, the bidding and contracting terms should include important penalties for the contractor if the level of service actually provided is lower than the agreed upon level. Moreover, the contracting terms must also include mechanisms to encourage the contractor to reach an even higher efficiency level than that contractually agreed upon in the initial commitment.
5. The main problem in putting this mechanism into practice lies in the difficulty of both measuring infrastructure quality inexpensively and of assessing the “gross social benefit” derived from a particular quality level. With respect to the former, it appears that some countries, such as Chile, are having success in defining quite extensive indices measuring infrastructure quality.